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W.: Personal Property--Gifts--Informal Writing as Constituting Suffic
CASE COMMENTS
Corp., 194 Va. 872,75 S.E.2d 694 (1953). On certiorari the Supreme
Court held that the state had jurisdiction to try the tort action even
though the same tortious act did, under the LMRA, constitute an unfair labor practice. The court proceeded on the theory that, since
the LMRA did not provide a remedy for the consequences of such
tortious conduct, it was still within the power of the state to award
such relief.
In the principal case the court held that although the Board, if
the respondent had applied to it, could have awarded him back pay,
the fact that the state would also make such an award in a tort action
would not cause a conflict of remedies.
It would seem then that in the principal case the Court could
have held, under the Garner case, that the power of the state to
award back pay in a tort action had been pre-empted since Congress
had given the Board the power, in its discretion to likewise make
such an award. However, the Court chose not to so hold, perhaps
because the awarding of back pay does not constitute full tort relief
in most cases of this nature, thereby indicating that Congress did not
intend for the Board to have jurisdiction in the tort aspect of labor
relations. In any case, it follows that by the outcome of the Russell
and Laburnum cases, supra, the Supreme Court is supporting preemption by direct conflict rather than pre-emption by entry into
the field.
It is felt that Congress could regulate even the tort phase of
labor relations under the commerce clause as hereinbefore stated;
however, the Board thus far has been given no jurisdiction in this
aspect of the field. It would seem in accord with the majority of
prior opinions concerning labor relations that until Congress legislates
in the tort realm of labor relations, the states will continue to have
jurisdiction although the act constituting the tort may also consist
of an unfair labor practice under the LMRA of 1947.
G. H. A.

PERSONAL PROPERTY-GUrS-INFo rAL WmnNGS AS CoNsTrrUrSuFFrCmcn DELIvERY.-Defendant wrote several letters to the
plaintiff, his former wife, in which he referred to certain bonds as
"your bonds". He also stated that he would draw the interest on
these bonds. Defendant had access to the bonds after the alleged
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gift, and upon their remarriage, the plaintiff discovered that the defendant had taken the bonds. The defendant refused to return the
bonds, claiming that he never gave them to the plaintiff. The plaintiff contends that there was a manual delivery of the bonds to her by
the defendant, who denied making any delivery. Held, the defendants letters to the plaintiff were sufficient to constitute a valid present gift of the bonds to the plaintiff, with the reservation of the interest in the defendant for life. Smith v. Smith, 253 F.2d 614 (4th
Cir. 1958).
The court was construing West Virginia law in this case. Bonds
are capable of being the subject of a gift in West Virginia. Taylor v.
Spurr, 126 W. Va. 778, 80 S.E. 487 (1924). There must be words of
a present gift as well as delivery. If it regards the future, it is but a
promise and being without consideration, cannot be enforced. Steber v. Combs, 121 W. Va. 509,5 S.E.2d 420 (1939). Upon one who
claims to be the donee of a gift rests the burden of proof to establish
every fact and circumstance necessary to show the validity of the
gift, of which the delivery of possession is the strongest and most essential. Dickerschied v. Exchange Bank, 28 W. Va. 340 (1886). A
gift may be inferred from the conduct of the parties, but the circum.
stances must be such as to put the question of intention beyond reasonable doubt. Morris v. Westerman, 79 W. Va. 502, 92 S.E. 567,
8 A.L.R. 1287 (1917).
The W. VA. CODE oh. 36, art. 1, § 5 (1955), states that, "no gift of
any goods or chattels shall be valid unless made by writing, signed by
the donor or his agent, or by will, or unless actual possession shall
have come to and remained with the donee or some person holding
for or under him.... No seal shall be necessary to give validity to a
gift of goods or chattels by writing, as hereinbefore provided".
There are no West Virginia cases construing the revised gift statute.
On the particular facts and circumstances involved, this was a case of
first impression. There is a split of authority on the question of informal writings or memoranda as being sufficient to constitute a delivery of goods or chattels and proving the proper donative intent
needed to constitute a valid gift inter vivos.
In the majority of the jurisdictions, the courts have refused to
sustain gifts evidenced only by the delivery in informal written instruments. Eldon v. Treadgall, 120 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1958);
DeMony v. Jepson,255 Ala. 877, 51 So. 2d 506 (1951); In re Seigle's
Estate, 176 Misc. 15, 26 N.Y.S.2d 410 (Surr. Ct. 1941); Dodson v.
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National Title Ins. Co., 159 Fla. 371, 31 So. 2d 402 (1947); Cross v.
Cross, 20 N.J. Misc. 359, 27 A.2d 877 (1942); Bank of Manhattan
Trust Co. v. Gray, 53 R.I. 377, 166 AUt. 817 (1953). Annot., 48
A.L.R. 2d 1405 (1956). These decisions are based on the grounds
that there was no delivery of the subject of the gift, no transfer of
possession, and the writings did not sufficiently show donative intent.
The jurisdictions following the minority view take the position
that delivery of informal memoranda and letters from the donor to
the donee is sufficient to perfect a transfer of a variety of gifts and is
sufficient to show the proper donative intent. In re Roosevelt's Will,
190 Misc. 841, 73 N.Y.S.2d 821 (Surr. Ct. 1947); .Jesse Parker Williams Hospital v. Nisbet, 189 Ga. 807, 7 S.E.2d 737 (1940); In re
Cohn, 187 App. Div. 392, 196 N.Y. Supp. 225 (1st Dep't 1919);
Hawkins v. Union Trust Co., 187 App. Div. 472, 175 N.Y. Supp. 694
(1st Dep't 1919). The minority view seems to follow the supposition that if a man's intent is to bestow a gift upon another and he
puts this intent in writing, and delivers the writing to the donee it
should be sufficient to constitute a gift, and his intent should not be
thwarted because he failed to adhere to certain strict, formal requirements.
The court of appeals took the minority view in deciding this
case. This view seems to be the more modem view and now has a
sizeable following. The requirements of using a deed of gift or a
will in order to bestow a gift of personal property upon a friend or
relative are vestiges of a bygone age and several states have done
away with them. It seems that the West Virginia legislature had
this in mind when they revised the gift statute. If, indeed, the only
writings sufficient to make a valid gift in West Virginia were held
to be a deed of gift or will, then the revision would be pointless, and
it is not likely that the legislature intended a pointless revision. A
man should be able to give his personal property to whom he pleases
and as long as his intentions are to make a gift, any writing expressing this intent and naming the donee, signed by the donor, should be
sufficient when delivered to the donee. Gifts are usually made to
members of one's family or friends as a method of showing affection
or friendship and such a gift should not be nullified by the courts because the donor failed to execute a formal instrument. Many times
it is not practical to make a manual delivery but it is never very difficult to send a letter. Also, a man is only as good as his word, and if
a man gives his word that he has made a gift, the fact that his word
appears in an informal rather than in a formal writing should not
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free him of his obligation to the donee, who may have relied heavily
upon the gift. The minority view should become the majority view
in the foreseeable future.
D. V. W.
REAL PRoPERTY-OiL AND GAS LEASES-RIGiTs OF LESSOn
AGANST SUBLESSE.-PaintiffS leased certain oil and gas lands to X.

By mesne assignments, B acquired X's rights under these leases, all of
which were recorded. In 1932, in compromise of a forfeiture suit
then being prosecuted by the plaintiff, the plaintiff and B entered
into a written modification agreement providing for an increase in
the amount of the royalties due the plaintiff. The modification
agreement was never recorded. In 1936 B subleased to the defendant and the defendant agreed to pay B such rents and royalties as B
might be chargeable with under the leases and agreements through
which B derived title. The terms of this sublease were substantially
reiterated in a new lease between B and the defendant in 1946. The
defendant was sued by the plaintiff for the excess in royalties provided for in the unrecorded agreement over the royalties provided
for in the recorded leases. Held, where a sublessee agrees with the
lessee to assume the obligations of the parent lease, the lessor has a
right of action as a creditor beneficiary on that contract regardless of
the recording statutes. Shearer v. United Carbon Co., 103 S.E.2d
883 (W. Va. 1958).
There is one matter that has led to considerable difficulty in an
analysis of this case as reported. The majority opinion mentions at
one point in their decision the fact that the defendant had actual notice of the unrecorded modification agreement prior to the signing of
the 1946 lease, under which recovery for the excess royalties was
sought le dissenting opinion states most emphatically that "the
defendant was not a party to such agreement, had no notice thereof,
or of any fact putting it on inquiry." The conflict thus presented by
the majority and minority opinions cannot be reconciled under the
limited facts of this case. In spite of the conflict of factual statements, the issue with which this comment is most concerned is
squarely raised. It is: is a modification agreement with respect to
mineral royalties within the coverage of the West Virginia recording
statutes?
The dissenting opinion was based on the contention that the
modification agreement was one necessarily covered by the record-
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